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 ABSTRACT 
 
Reactions towards and perceptions of unfair offers in the ultimatum game have 
been studied extensively. However, little research to date has focused on people’s 
understandings of hyperfair (altruistic) offers – that is, offers that are unfair in one’s 
own favor. Participants played a version of the ultimatum game in which they received 
a fair (50-50) or hyperfair (80-20) offer from a confederate proposer. The present 
research demonstrated that compared to fair offers, hyperfair offers led to increased 
positive mood and decreased negative mood, such that those initially reporting low 
positive mood were most positively impacted by a hyperfair offer. Secondly, people 
avoided interpersonal contact with those who were hyperfair and perceived them as 
being less conscientious and more open. Although hyperfair offers did not have any 
significant impact on people’s donations to charity, an interesting trend emerged: 
participants who donated to charity thought of their hyperfair proposer as being more 
extraverted, more agreeable, and less neurotic. These results have important 
implications for our understandings of altruists and altruistic behaviors. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“I don’t know if there are any moral saints. But if there are, I am glad that 
neither I nor those whom I care most about are among them.” – Susan Wolf 
 
Much of day-to-day interaction revolves around occasional altruistic acts: 
imagine a friend helping you move, or a neighbor allowing you to borrow a cup of 
sugar when you have run out. However, such interactions typically revolve around the 
understanding of reciprocity. In other words, a friend that helps you move will most 
likely expect that you will do the same for them at a later point in time. Similarly, a 
neighbor that lends you his/her kitchen ingredients is likely to have the understanding 
that you would behave likewise. Alternatively, imagine that your friend, who has 
recently helped you move, refuses to either ask for or accept your help when they 
themselves move. Or a neighbor who refuses to accept any money for having given 
you their last three bags of sugar. Such actions of “moral saintliness” are overly 
altruistic, unfair, and are rarely studied in the realm of psychology. At the same time, 
however, they represent an interesting philosophical dilemma: is there such a thing as 
“too much” altruism?  
The concept of fairness, or the idea that every person should receive an equal 
share of a commodity of interest, has long been studied in moral psychology (e.g., 
Alvi, 1998; Gorman, 1973; Kashima, Siegal, Tanaka, & Isaka, 1987; Kohlberg, 1963; 
Steibe & McCarrey, 1982; Siegal, 1982). Even young children have some intuitive 
sense of “fairness” – when asked to split a food reward, children have an implicit 
understanding that it must be done in such a way that both parties receive equal 
amounts (Fehr, Bernhart, & Rockenbach, 2008; Tomasello & Warneken, 2008). In 
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fact, the concept seems so widely innate that there has been recent debate as to 
whether non-human primates can also understand the concept of “fair exchanges” 
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Jensen, Hare, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2006).  
As such, people’s perceptions of and reactions to “unfairness” have been a 
topic of interest as well. However, psychology to date has almost exclusively studied 
unfairness as it pertains to one’s reactions to being the victim of an unfair offer (that is, 
receiving less than one’s fair share). Relatively little research has focused on one’s 
reactions to being the beneficiary of an unfair offer (receiving more than one’s fair 
share; referred to in this paper as hyperfairness). In this sense, our ideas of fairness 
have been narrowly studied. This work thus aimed to close this gap in the current 
literature by studying both how we react towards hyperfair offers and how we perceive 
those who behave in a hyperfair manner. 
Past Research 
Ultimatum Game 
Commonly, reactions to unfair and hyperfair resource exchanges have been 
studied in a procedure dubbed the “ultimatum game” (Guth, Schmittberger, & 
Schwarze, 1982), in which two people must split a sum of money (usually $10) 
between themselves and another person.  
One person plays the role of the “proposer”, who must decide the “best way” 
to split, and another plays the role of the “responder”, whose role is to accept or reject 
the split. If the responder accepts the split, each party receives the money as was 
agreed upon. If the responder rejects the split, neither party receives any money. 
Responders typically do not behave in a way that rationally maximizes their earnings 
(see Guth & Tietz, 1990 and Thaler, 1988 for reviews). Instead, responders react in 
accordance with a fairness model, in which they reject offers that are unequal, despite 
the understanding that neither party will receive any money as a result. In other words, 
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if a responder is offered $2, out of a total of $10, they typically opt to receive no 
money as opposed to receive their (unequal) earnings. This pattern has been widely 
studied and replicated. 
Hyperfairness 
Some recent cross-cultural research has now looked at participants’ reactions 
to hyperfair offers. Already, there is some evidence from such studies that people may 
be led to reject hyperfair offers. In Bahry & Wilson’s (2006) study, participants were 
dwellers of the Russian countryside regions. When offered a hyperfair offer, a large 
number (56.5%) rejected despite the fact that their personal earnings would be 
maximized. Importantly, this appeared in participants holding particularly egalitarian 
beliefs. The same pattern appeared to emerge in China (Hennig-Schmidt, Li, & Yang, 
2008), as well as various small scale societies (Henrich et al., 2005), but not in the 
United States. 
 The hyperfairness manipulation using the ultimatum game provides a 
convenient way to measure people’s perceptions of altruism. This study therefore used 
an ultimatum game hyperfairness manipulation to study how hyperfairness is 
perceived and reacted to. Specifically, the underlying hypothesis in this research is 
that our understandings of altruism may be largely qualified. Although in general, 
altruistic acts are held in high regard, perhaps with hyperfairness, this may not be the 
case.  
Current Research 
One important question is whether unfairly positive (hyperfair) offers impact 
mood. Past research has found that money positively impacts mood (e.g., Johnson & 
Krueger, 2006). However, does the source of this money matter? In other words, do 
people feel better or worse after receiving an unfairly altruistic act from another 
person? Researchers that have looked at hyperfairness in the ultimatum game (i.e., 
Bahry & Wilson, 2006; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2008; Henrich et al., 2005) did not 
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include mood measures in their observations of participants’ understandings of 
hyperfairness. However, as stated previously, rejections of hyperfair offers were 
prevalent in other societies. Therefore, while hyperfairness is an observable 
phenomenon, relatively little is known about how it impacts the responder. Therefore, 
this study assessed participant mood as a function of the type of offer one receives 
from another person. 
 A second motivation for this study was to determine how one perceives the 
hyperfair proposer. Do we hold these above-and-beyond altruists in high regard? Or, 
alternatively, are they perceived more poorly than others? Evidence from past research 
has been mixed in this regard. A recent study by Takezawa, Gummerum, & Keller 
(2006) using eleven-year-olds showed that children who were altruistic proposers 
were often unable to convince others to make the same choices they did. That is, 
children who chose to act in an altruistic manner couldn’t convince their classmates to 
do the same. Surprisingly, this pattern occurred even when these “altruists” were in the 
majority. Intuitively, this appears justified: giving away more than what is required in 
an ultimatum game may be perceived as an irrational gaming strategy. Therefore, it is 
possible that hyperfair proposers will be judged more negatively than fair proposers. 
On the other hand, altruistic acts can build up one’s reputation (e.g., Wedekind & 
Braithwaite, 2002) and social status (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006), specifically by being 
viewed as agreeable and emotionally stable (Ashton, Paunonen, Helmes, & Jackson, 
1998). According to this account, a hyperfair proposer may be viewed as an altruist 
and therefore judged more positively than a fair proposer. This study thus investigated 
these two competing possibilities.  
Along the same lines, the hyperfairness manipulation allows us to test whether 
people are uncomfortable in engaging in contact with those who are hyperfair. 
Specifically, when given the option, do people seek out or avoid contact with hyperfair 
others? This question is motivated in part by Fehr et al.’s (2002) theory of strong 
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reciprocity, in which people are bound to reward those who behave altruistically. 
However, the theory is largely descriptive and their empirical work leaves open the 
question of whether people actively seek to reciprocate altruistic acts, or passively feel 
as though they must act in accordance with societal expectations to reciprocate such 
acts. Participants in this study were therefore given the choice of whether or not to 
interact with their hyperfair proposers. Because face-to-face interaction was the only 
chance participants had to “thank” (i.e., reward) their hyperfair proposer, they should 
engage in such interaction if the former account (that is, that people actively seek to 
reward altruism) is true. However, if the latter account holds and people in fact, do not 
feel a strong internal pull to reward altruism, then people should instead avoid face-to-
face contact with their proposer.  
Finally, it is conceivable that hyperfairness can impact one’s own giving 
behaviors. Does altruism (and hyperfairness) spread onto others? The theory of 
indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005) predicts that this is 
indeed the case: humans may behave altruistically for the sake of being rewarded by 
society as a whole or a non-specific other, rather than by the direct recipient of their 
altruistic act. Participants in this study were therefore asked if they would like to 
donate a portion of their recently made proceeds to a charity of their choice. The idea 
here was that although there was no chance for reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) in 
that participants could not give money back to their proposers, people may instead be 
motivated by indirect reciprocation. I expected that participants who had received a 
hyperfair offer would be more motivated to donate their proceeds to charity.  This 
study manipulation therefore aimed to provide a straightforward test of the theory of 
indirect reciprocity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants were 94 Cornell University affiliates and 1 Ithaca area resident (44 
male, 51 female; ages 18-46 with Mean age = 21.78 and SD = 4.88) recruited through 
an online website and/or flyers on campus. All participants received $8 as part of the 
experimental procedure. 
Procedure 
 Participants were run in groups of 1 to 4 (with each participant in a separate 
room) in a building on the Cornell University campus. All participants were first led 
into a quiet room and told that they would be playing an economic game in which they 
would be asked to split a pot of money ($10) between themselves and “another 
participant” waiting in a separate room. In reality, no such “other participant” existed. 
After filling out a brief demographics form (Appendix A), the experimenter then 
handed each participant instructions regarding the ultimatum game (Appendix B), as 
well as a four-question comprehension check (Appendix B) to assure that they had 
fully understood the rules of the game and received answers to any questions they may 
have had. Ninety out of 95 participants answered all four questions correctly and no 
participant missed more than one question. The five participants who initially missed a 
question were provided corrective feedback and then re-prompted for the answer. 
Every participant answered the question correctly after the re-prompt.  
After a brief pause intended to simulate the experimenter waiting for the 
confederate to finish reading directions (during which the experimenter left the room), 
all participants were given a form (Appendix C) explaining that they had been 
randomly chosen to play the role of the responder. In order to asses mood before the 
manipulation (at baseline), participants were then asked to fill out a 10-item subset of 
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the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; 4 positive items and 6 negative items), 
while waiting for the “other person” to decide how to split the money. Items from the 
PANAS were selected a priori to reflect those most appropriate to the task. All 
questions were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1= “not at all” to 5= “extremely”).  
Manipulation 
 After completing the PANAS, participants were randomly selected into one of 
two conditions: In the hyperfair condition, participants were told that the proposer has 
decided to split the money in the following manner: $8 will go to the participant, and 
$2 will be kept for the responder (a hyperfair offer). In the control condition, 
participants were told that the proposer had decided on a fair ($5/$5) split but that due 
to extra funds that the experimenter has for this project, they would be receiving an 
additional $3 for participation, totaling $8. For exact wording, see Appendices D and 
E for the experimental and control conditions, respectively.  
It is important to note that participants in each condition received the 
equivalent amount of money so as to control for the possibility that any effects found 
were due to receiving more money, and not due to receiving a hyperfair offer. 
Additionally, in each condition, participants received more money than they had 
originally anticipated. That is, presumably, no participant expected to receive more 
than $5 as part of the ultimatum game. As such, it can be said that the experimental 
condition exceeded participants’ expectations. To control for this possibility, the 
control condition had been carefully selected to also exceed participants’ expectations 
(no participant was told about the $3 for participation prior). Thus, the only difference 
between conditions was whether the total sum comes from a fair or hyperfair offer 
from the proposer. 
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Dependent Measures 
Following the manipulation, all participants were asked to accept or reject the 
offer, and then given a series of questionnaires to fill out1: 
Post-Manipulation Mood 
To begin, participants once again filled out the 10-item subset of the PANAS. 
Perceptions of the Proposer 
 To assess views of the hyperfair proposer, participants filled out a 44-item 
version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999) which asked 
participants to rate the “other player” (the proposer) on five main personality factors: 
extraversion, agreeableness, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and emotional 
stability (see Appendix F). Specifically, participants read the following instructions: 
“Please answer some additional questions about your partner. Here are a number of 
characteristics that may or may not apply to them. Please give your best guess for the 
type of person your partner may have been.” All items were rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1= “not at all” to 5= “extremely”). In the past, the BFI has been shown to have 
high internal validity (Soto & John, 2009), and has been used to assess people’s 
accuracies in understanding another person’s personality based on impersonal cues 
(e.g., Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002).  
Interpersonal Contact 
Participants were then informed that they would be playing two more games in 
which they will need to cooperate with another person (Appendix G). The first game, 
participants read, would involve playing with a partner waiting in a separate room. 
The second game, however, would involve interacting with a partner face-to-face.  In 
order to control for order effects, the presentation of these two games was 
                                                 
1 The ordering of the post-manipulation questionnaires was as follows: (1) post-manipulation mood 
measures, (2) additional questionnaires, (3) charity donation, (4) interpersonal/impersonal contact, and 
(5) the Big Five Inventory.  
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counterbalanced. Participants were then given one of two options for each game: they 
could either choose to play with the person they had just played with (i.e., the 
proposer) or opt to have the experimenter choose another player at random for them. 
In reality, participants were not actually. However, participants’ choices for partner 
preference for each of the games was recorded. 
Charity Donation 
Afterwards, each participant read a series of brief (two-paragraph) excerpts 
about four charities (Appendix H): UNICEF, Doctors without Borders, Tompkins 
County ASPCA, and the Cornell Annual Fund. The presentation of these charities was 
randomly ordered. The selection of these charities was meant to reflect a broad range 
of causes, such that any participant would be likely find at least one cause worth 
donating to. However, in order to check for this, each participant was asked to answer 
two questions after reading about each charity: “How worthy is this cause?” and “How 
much do you believe in this cause’s mission statement?” All responses were be on a 7-
point Likert (1= “not at all worthy” to 7= “extremely worthy”) scale. All 95 
participants rated at least one charity a “6” or above on both questions.  
After reading the excerpts, participants were asked if they would like to donate 
any of their earnings to the charity of their choice (Appendix I). All participants then 
selected a charity, checked off whether or not they would like to give to that charity, 
and deposited the checked form as well as whatever money they wished to donate to 
the charity of their choice into a white envelope provided by the experimenter. The 
white envelope was then deposited into a large manila envelope titled “Charity 
Donations”. In order to increase believability, each manila envelope already contained 
3 confederate white envelopes from “other participants”. 
Debriefing 
 Following the participant indicating their choices, they were prompted for 
suspicion about the nature of the study, and then debriefed.  
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Additional Questionnaires 
Each participant filled out two additional questionnaires (Appendix J) not 
described or analyzed in this research.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Three people were excluded from the final analyses for rejecting the proposer’s 
offer. All three participants were in the “hyperfair” condition. Therefore, the final 
sample consisted of 92 participants (40 male, 52 female), ages 18-46 (M = 21.85, SD = 
4.94).2 
Mood 
 These analyses aimed to determine whether being the recipient of a hyperfair 
offer had an impact on one’s mood. Following procedures used in past research 
(Watson et al., 1988), items from the two PANAS questionnaires were summed and 
averaged to create two scores – a “positive”  and “negative” mood index (Cronbach’s 
alphas = .80 and .82, respectively). Moreover, these scores were further split into 
“baseline mood” (completed before the manipulation) and “post-manipulation mood” 
(completed after the manipulation), to create a total of four mood scores: positive 
baseline, positive post-manipulation, negative baseline, and negative post-
manipulation. 
Manipulation Check 
A paired-samples t-tests revealed that positive mood was significantly higher 
after the manipulation (M = 3.70, SD = .75), than at baseline (M = 3.32, SD = .71), 
t(87) = -5.16, p < .001. Similarly, participants reported significantly lower negative 
mood after the manipulation (M = 1.28, SD = .40), than at baseline (M = 1.78, SD = 
.70), t(87) = 7.62, p < .001. These analyses provided a manipulation check and thus 
                                                 
2 Each separate analysis also removed any outliers (if present) in the data set. Outliers were defined as 
data points exceeding a distance of three standard deviations from the mean. 
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ensured that receiving money as part of the experimental procedure, regardless of 
condition, both raised positive mood and lowered negative mood. 
Positive Mood 
In order to test the effect of hyperfairness on mood, two separate multiple 
linear regression analyses (one assessing positive mood and one assessing negative 
mood) were run. The first regression used positive post-manipulation mood as the 
response and positive baseline mood and condition type (condition was dummy coded 
“1” for experimental (“hyperfairness”) group and “0” for the control) as the predictors. 
There was a significant positive linear relationship between positive baseline mood 
and positive post-manipulation mood, B = .89, SE = .14, t(86) = 6.50, p < .001. 
Condition type also significantly predicted positive post-manipulation mood, B = 1.78, 
SE = .62, t(1) = 1.96, p < .01, such that those in the experimental condition reported 
greater positive mood than those in the control condition. These main effects were 
qualified by a baseline positive mood x condition type interaction, B = -.52, SE = .18, 
t(86) = -2.88, p < .01, suggesting that the “hyperfairness” condition dampened the 
linear relationship between positive baseline and positive post-manipulation mood (see 
Figure 1.1).  
To further examine this interaction, I sought to determine the effect of 
condition on the “most positive” and “least positive” participants. Therefore, two 
additional regressions were run, one using the top 25% of baseline positive mood 
scores and the second using the bottom 25%. Once again, each regression used 
positive post-manipulation mood as a predictor and condition type and positive 
baseline mood as a response. The regression using the “most positive” participants 
(top 25%) once again revealed a significant positive linear association between 
positive baseline mood and positive post-manipulation mood, B = .82, SE = .31, t(43) 
= 2.61, p < .05. However, condition type did not significantly impact post-
manipulation mood and the condition type x positive baseline mood interaction was  
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Figure 1.1. Positive Post-Manipulation Mood as a Function of Positive Baseline Mood 
and Condition 
 
non-significant, both ps > .90. Therefore, the hyperfair offer failed to have an effect on 
the initially “most positive” participants. Note that because the top 25th percentile 
included all participants who reported an average positive mood of 3.44 on a 5 point 
scale, this effect was unlikely to be due to a “ceiling effect”. 
The second linear regression (using the “least positive” participants) showed 
that positive baseline mood significantly predicted positive post-manipulation mood, B 
= .89, SE = .43, t(41) = 2.06, p < .05. Condition type was also significantly associated 
with post-manipulation mood, B = 3.09, SE = 1.46, t(1) = 2.12, p < .05, such that those 
in the experimental condition reported feeling more positive post-manipulation mood 
than those in the control condition. The condition type x positive baseline mood 
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interaction was non-significant, p > .05. The hyperfair offer thus raised the mood of 
the initially “least positive” participants, suggesting that hyperfair offers have an effect 
on those who initially report low positive mood, but not those who are already in a 
positive mood. 
Negative Mood 
 The second set of multiple linear regression analyses used negative post-
manipulation mood as a response and negative baseline mood and condition type as 
the predictors. Again, there was a significant positive linear relationship between 
negative baseline mood and negative post-manipulation mood, B = .17, SE = .07, t(86) 
= 2.43, p < .05. Condition type also significantly impacted negative post-manipulation 
mood, B = -.47, SE = .21, t(1) = -2.28, p < .05, such that those in the experimental 
condition reported less negative mood than those in the control condition. Once again, 
these effects were qualified by a significant negative baseline mood x condition type 
interaction, B = .29, SE = .11, t(86) = 2.63, p < .05, suggesting that the control 
condition dampened the linear relationship between pre- and post-manipulation 
negative mood (see Figure 1.2).  
 Once again, to further examine this interaction, participants were split into 
“most negative” and “least negative” (top 25% and bottom 25% baseline negative 
mood scores, respectively) and two regressions were run using each group. For the 
“most negative” participants, neither negative baseline mood nor condition type 
significantly predicted negative post-manipulation scores, both ps > .10. The 
interaction term was also non-significant, p > .05. The same results were obtained for 
the regression using “least negative” participants, all ps > .20. Therefore, the effect of 
condition type on the relationship between pre and post-manipulation negative mood 
less conclusive. 
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Figure 1.2. Negative Post-Manipulation Mood as a Function of Negative Baseline 
Mood and Condition 
 
 Overall these results showed that participants reported better mood (more 
positive and less negative) after receiving a hyperfair (vs. fair) offer. However, the 
experimental condition also dampened the linear relationship between pre- and post-
manipulation mood, such that those who already had reported feeling positive did not 
feel more positive as a result of a hyperfair offer. However, those who were least 
positive initially were more positively affected by receiving a generous (hyperfair) 
proposal from another person.  
Perceptions of the Proposer 
 The second set of analyses tested how hyperfair offers impact participants’ 
perceptions of the proposer. Following procedures used in past research, a “score” was 
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calculated for each of the five personality factors by summing and averaging relevant 
items pertaining to that score (John & Srivastava, 2009; Cronbach’s alphas ranging 
from .61 - .85). Negatively worded items were reverse scored. 
 A series of independent t-tests revealed that those who received a hyperfair 
offer perceived their “proposer” as being less conscientious (M = 3.36, SD = .53), than 
those in the control condition (M = 3.70, SD = .47), t(85) = 3.09, p < .01, suggesting 
that those who had a hyperfair proposer saw him as a poor gaming strategist. 
Additionally, there was a marginally significant trend suggesting that those who 
received a hyperfair offer also perceived their proposer as being more open (M = 3.19, 
SD = .40) than those in the control condition (M = 3.02, SD = .42), t(85) = -1.93, p = 
.06. The differences between  
conditions for the other three factors (extraversion, neuroticism, and agreeableness) 
were non-significant, all ps > .20. See Figure 2. 
Interpersonal Contact 
 The third questions was whether people would desire or avoid engaging in 
interpersonal contact with their proposer following a hyperfair (versus fair) offer. To 
test for this, participants’ partner choices for the “interpersonal contact game” and the 
“impersonal contact game” were recorded. Specifically, participants were told that 
they would be playing two more games and could choose the partner they have just 
played with (the proposer in the ultimatum game) or a different partner, to be selected 
at random by the experimenter.  
For the interpersonal contact game, 13 of the 45 participants in the experimental 
condition said they would prefer to play with a different partner. In contrast, only 4 out 
of 46 participants in the control condition said they would prefer a different partner. 
This difference was statistically significant, χ2 (N = 91) = 6.11, p < .05, suggesting that 
people avoid interpersonal contact with the proposer following a hyperfair offer.
  
 
 
Note. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean    + p = .06  * p < .05 
Figure 2. Ratings for the Big Five Factors in the Fair and Hyperfair Conditions 
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However, there was no significant difference in partner preference between the 
experimental and control conditions in the impersonal contact game, p > .10. 
Therefore, people avoided face-to-face contact with their hyperfair proposers, but it 
appears that they did not necessarily avoid impersonal contact. 
 
Table 1. Means (SDs in parentheses) of Big-Five Factor Ratings for Those Who 
Donated and Those Who Did Not 
 Donation No Donation 
Extraversion * 3.15 
(.54) 
2.90 
(.49) 
Agreeableness **   4.16 
(.62) 
3.76 
(.57) 
Conscientiousness  + 3.63 
(.52) 
3.43 
(.52) 
Neuroticism ** 2.31 
(.49) 
2.65 
(.53) 
Openness 3.19 
(.46) 
3.04 
(.46) 
+ p = .08 * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
Charity Donations 
 I predicted that hyperfair offers would lead to a greater number of donations to 
charities. That is, being the subject of generosity should impact one’s own generosity. 
A χ2 analysis using condition type (experimental vs. control) as the predictor and 
presence of charity donation (yes or no) as a response revealed no significant effects 
of condition on one’s donations to charity, p > .20. To test what did impact donation 
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preferences, condition type, the five BFI scores and positive and negative post-
manipulation scores were entered into a binary logistic model, with presence of charity 
donation (yes or no) as a response. None of the predictors were significant, all ps > 
.10.  
However, an interesting finding emerged: those who donated perceived their 
partner as more extraverted, t(85) = -2.23, p < .05, more agreeable, t(85) = -3.21, p < 
.01, and less neurotic, t(85) = 3.15, p < .01. The differences for the other two BFI 
scores (conscientiousness and openness) were non-significant, both ps > .05. For 
means and standard deviations, see Table 1. The interpretation of this finding is later 
discussed (see Discussion). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
General Discussion 
 As stated previously, one can imagine many real-world scenarios involving 
unreciprocated, hyperfair altruism. However, relatively little is known about the 
psychological processes underlying these behaviors. This study was the first to 
investigate people’s thoughts and behaviors following the receipt of a hyperfair offer. 
 To begin, nearly every person (except for three) in this sample accepted the 
hyperfair offer, thus contrasting past research (Bahry & Wilson, 2006; Hennig-
Schmidt et al., 2008) using participants of other cultures. However, both of the 
referenced experiments were done in communist societies, suggesting that the 
participants in this sample held differing beliefs. It is not clear, however, whether the 
difference found in this study reflects differing inward beliefs and value systems or 
culturally acceptable norms of behavior, drive people to reject hyperfair offers. 
 Secondly, this experiment found that hyperfair offers significantly improve 
mood (raise positive and lower negative mood) compared with fair offers. This effect 
is especially compelling when considering the fact that those in the control condition 
received the same amount of money ($8) and more money than they had initially 
expected ($5). In the past, money has been shown to have a significant impact on 
mood (e.g., Johnson & Krueger, 2006). Results from this study however, show that the 
source of that money actually matters – specifically, others’ generosity causes better 
mood. Moreover, this effect was most pronounced for people who reported being 
unhappy initially. As stated earlier, this effect was unlikely to be due to a ceiling 
effect. This finding is in line with past work showing that those who were put in 
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situations eliciting low mood were faster to focus on positive interactions from others 
(DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009). Similarly, initially low positive mood participants 
in this study may have been particularly excited by another person’s generosity. 
 Furthermore, this experiment tested how people actually perceive those who 
act in a hyperfair manner. Participants in this study reported their hyperfair proposer 
as being unconscientious. This may suggest that people perceived the proposer as 
having made some sort of gaming mistake. Indeed, several participants had questioned 
the experimenter during the procedure if the $8 offer was a mistake. This may seem in 
contrast to previous work which has found that altruists are generally perceived in a 
positive light (Wedekind & Brathwaite, 2002; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006), but such 
work has primarily focused on altruism with a cause, not hyperfairness. That is, people 
may perceive altruists well when they can explain the reasons for their altruism. 
Alternatively, it is possible that altruism during gaming scenarios is perceived 
differently than altruism in the real world.  
There was also a marginally significant trend for people to perceive their 
altruists as being more open. Although there is little theoretical basis for this 
observation, it is important to note that openness and conscientiousness were the two 
most prominent effects observed in Gosling et al.’s (2002) study, in which participants 
were asked to guess others’ personalities based on impersonal cues such as rooms and 
offices. This finding, combined with Gosling et al.’s (2002) work, then suggests that 
these two factors (conscientiousness and openness) may be easiest to form lay theories 
about. 
 This study also found that people seek to avoid face-to-face contact with their 
hyperfair proposers. Because people did not avoid impersonal contact, this aversion 
goes beyond simple belief that the hyperfair proposer was a poor gaming strategist. 
Participants may have felt guilty for accepting a generous offer from another (e.g., 
Benkel, Wijk, & Molander, 2009) and “duping” the proposer in some way. Another 
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reason may be that participants felt suspicious about the proposer’s behavior. The 
current design did not distinguish between these two possibilities.  
 Finally, on a behavioral level, this experiment looked at people’s charity 
donations following a hyperfair offer. It was predicted that if people felt somehow 
uncomfortable with the hyperfair proposal, they should be motivated to give away a 
portion of their money to charity. However, people were not any more likely to donate 
to charity following a hyperfair vs. fair offer. There are several interpretations for this 
effect. First, it is possible that donating money was in a sense, too much to ask of the 
participants. Very few people may have felt the pressure to do so during an 
anonymous gaming experiment.  
Another possibility is that the present design employed an inadequate control. 
Because the control condition stated that people will “receive $3 from the 
experimenter”, those in the control condition may have perceived the “extra $3” as an 
altruistic behavior from the experimenter. Evidence for this fact comes from two 
sources: First, many participants mentioned a thank you in their debriefing form for 
the “extra funds”. Secondly, 44 out of 92 participants (48%) in both conditions 
donated to charity – this is a larger number than what might be expected if participants 
were not pressured to donate in either condition. This then implies that generosity did 
have an effect on donation, but that the control condition used was inappropriate for 
the current study. Simple rephrasing of the wording in the control condition may aid in 
discovering an effect, if present.  
Finally, it is possible that hyperfair offers do not inspire generosity in others. 
Past research has assessed this only via indirect means: money positively impacts 
mood (e.g., Johnson & Krueger, 2006), and positive mood impacts one’s own 
generosity (e.g., Cunningham, 1979; Harris & Smith, 1975; Isen & Levin, 1972; Isen 
& Simmonds, 1978). However, research to date has not investigated whether these two 
discrete events can form a causal chain. This study provides some evidence for the fact 
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that the causal chain may in fact be broken: people in the hyperfair condition did in 
fact experience a change in positive mood as a result of someone’s generosity, but did 
not, in turn, feel more inclined to be generous themselves. However, the foregoing 
issues with the control condition should be addressed prior to making strong 
conclusions in this regard. 
 Although no effects between conditions were observed, people who donated 
perceived their partner as being more extraverted, agreeable, and less neurotic. This is 
in line with Ashton et al.’s (1998) study, which found that those who had traits 
commonly associated with reciprocal altruism were also more agreeable and less 
neurotic. Overall, this suggests that those who donated had a more positive view of 
others over those who did not. However, because neither presence of charity donation 
nor perception of the proposer were manipulated, it is not clear if those who perceived 
their partner more positively decided to donate to charity, donating caused people to 
see their partner more positively, or a third variable, such as mood, affected both 
donations to charity and perceptions of the proposer. However, this effect is promising 
and paves the way for further research.  
Future Directions 
Using the results found in this study, several experiments may be outlined for 
future work. First, it is important to replicate this work in more ecologically valid 
scenarios prior to forming strong conclusions regarding the role of hyperfairness in 
people’s everyday cognition. One follow-up study could attempt to replicate these 
effects using increased believability – rather than informing participants that there is 
another participant waiting in a separate room, future work should use actual 
confederates to play the role of the proposer. Indeed, several participants indicated 
some doubt with regards to whether the proposer was real. Therefore, it is particularly 
important to replicate these findings using more embellished believability. Another 
way to increase ecological validity is to study could look at how hyperfairness is 
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perceived outside of the ultimatum game. One potential idea may be to have a 
confederate wait in a waiting room with a real participant. During the wait, the 
confederate and the participant (together) would spontaneously find $10 on the floor 
and offer the participant to split the money in either a fair way, or a hyperfair ($8/$2) 
way.  
Another interesting subsequent question might be: following the receipt of an 
altruistic offer, will people seek out or avoid contact with all people or simply the 
hyperfair proposer? In the past, negative interactions with specific others have led to 
increased aggression (Catanese & Tice, 2003; Warburton, Williams, & Cairns, 2005) 
and decreased prosocial behaviors (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & 
Bartels, 2007) towards people as a whole. In addition, the theory of indirect 
reciprocity (discussed earlier) also suggests that behaviors may be directed towards 
non-specific others. Thus, there is reason to believe that the effect found in this study 
may be extended apply to all people, as opposed to the altruistic proposer only. 
Additionally, it may be interesting to investigate the types of interaction that people do 
engage in following a hyperfair offer. Perhaps individuals will engage in positive 
forms of interpersonal contact (i.e., thanking the person, talking, unconscious 
mimicry, etc.) once they are forced into a situation in which contact is unavoidable.  
This idea, however, is currently derived largely from intuition and deserves further 
empirical investigation.  
Importantly, although this experiment did not find any effects of charity 
donations, future work could further examine this possibility. A follow-up study could 
use more implicit measures such as attitudes about donating, or helpful behaviors not 
involving money such as signing up for volunteer activities.  
Because there was a difference between those who donated and those who did 
not in their perceptions of the proposer, a future study could manipulate one’s 
perceptions of the proposer by supplying a brief “self-description” (actually written by 
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the experimenter) of the proposer. Information about the other player’s gender impacts 
behavior in the ultimatum game (Scharlermann, Eckel, & Wilson, 2001). Therefore, 
future studies might find that other attributes such as personality characteristics could 
affect behavior as well. Alternatively, donations to charity could be manipulated by 
asking participants to donate a set amount to the charity of their choice. 
Future work may also extend these results by studying the development of 
children’s understanding of hyperfairness. Specifically, does our conception of 
hyperfairness develop from a young age, or is it societally embedded? (Of course, it is 
also conceivable that both possibilities are true.) Are children wary of “moral 
saintliness” (hyperfairness) and is there an age at which this wariness emerges? Such 
work would largely contribute to the already existing literature on children’s 
understandings of fairness and morality: Starting from 7-8 years, children begin to act 
“fairly” (Fehr et al., 2008). Even earlier (5 years), children have relatively complex 
models of fairness and can apply those models in hypothetical dilemmas (e.g., Rochat 
et al., 2009) and even ultimatum game scenarios (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998). Finally, 
even younger than that, children have intuitions about others’ beliefs, desires, (for 
review, see Wellman & Liu, 2004). and intentions (Chandler, Sokol, & Hallett, 2001). 
It follows then, that children will have some conceptions of hyperfairness, may infer 
belief and intention states from those who are hyperfair, and would be affected 
behaviorally by a hyperfair offer. The age during which a conception of hyperfairness 
occurs and the manner in which the process unfolds deserves empirical investigation. 
 Overall, results from this study have important implications for both past 
research and the real world. In reality, there may be countless encounters with “moral 
saints” who choose to act prosocially without any direct benefit – imagine a complete 
stranger donating a large sum of money to a charitable cause, or the myriad of people 
who donate their organs to those in need through an anonymous exchange. Just as 
society opts not to allow people to meet their organ donor, participants in this study 
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chose not to meet their hyperfair proposer. However, just as the recipients of an 
anonymous organ donation presumably feel positive about such, so did the 
participants in this study. The results of this work therefore provide mixed conclusions 
regarding the role of altruism: while people are generally happy to receive an altruistic 
offer, they avoid contact with altruists, believe them to be unconscientious, and are not 
led to be more altruistic themselves. Although further empirical work is needed to 
situate these conclusions within a broader context, this experiment suggests that 
perhaps it is the selfishly driven altruists, not the “moral saints” that are held in such 
high regard. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
Sex: 
_ male 
_ female 
_ other 
 
Age: 
____ years 
 
College major: ___________ 
Race/Ethnicity:  
__ Caucasian 
__ East or South Asian 
__ Hispanic 
__ Pacific Islander 
__ Native American 
__ African American 
__ Biracial/Interracial 
__ Other 
__ Do not wish to provide 
 
Nationality: ____________________________ 
 
School Year (if this is summer, indicate school year you will be entering): 
___ Freshman 
___ Sophomore 
___ Junior 
___ Senior 
___ Graduate Student 
___ Faculty Member 
___ Staff Member 
___ Other (please specify): ___________________ 
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APPENDIX B:  INSTRUCTIONS AND COMPREHENSION CHECK 
You will be playing a game against another participant (waiting in the other room). 
You are ensured complete anonymity – neither of you will interact in person or find 
out any identifying information about one another. 
During the game, one of you will play the role of the proposer, and one will play the 
role of the responder. You will both be given $10 to split between the two of you.  
The proposer's role will be to choose how they wish to split the money. The 
responder may then agree to the split (in which case, you each get the amount you 
agreed on), or reject the split (in which case, neither of you gets any money). 
In order to make sure you understand the game before we start playing, we ask that 
you answer the following questions: 
1. Who will be deciding how to split the money? (circle one)   
                 proposer   responder 
3. Once a split is proposed, what two choices does the responder have? 
4. If the proposer offers a $6 (for the proposer)/$4 (for the responder) split, how 
much does each person receive if the responder accepts the offer: 
1. Proposer: 
2. Responder: 
4. How much does each person receive if the responder rejects the offer: 
1. Proposer: 
2. Responder 
 
When you are ready to play, please let the experimenter know.  
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APPENDIX C: BASELINE MOOD QUESTIONNAIRE 
You have been randomly selected to play the role of the responder. While the 
proposer is deciding how to split the money, please fill out these questionnaires: 
 
At the moment, I feel: 
 Not at All                  Very Much 
1. tense  1  2   3   4   5 
2. dissatisfied 1  2  3  4  5 
3. cheerful  1  2  3  4  5 
4. hostile  1  2  3  4  5 
5. sad   1  2  3  4  5 
6. interested  1  2  3  4  5 
7. happy  1  2  3  4  5 
8. irritated  1  2  3  4  5 
9. upset  1  2  3  4  5 
10. relaxed  1  2  3  4  5 
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENTAL GROUP MANIPULATION 
 
The proposer has offered to split the money in the following way: 
 
 
___$8___will go to you. 
___$2___ will go to the proposer. 
 
 
Please check off one of these options to indicate what you would like to do: 
________ I would like to accept the offer. 
________ I would like to reject the offer. 
 
*** Note: To increase believability, dollar values were written in by the experimenter 
in the actual questionnaire handed to participants*** 
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APPENDIX E: CONTROL GROUP MANIPULATION 
The proposer has offered to split the money in the following way: 
 
____$5____ will go to you. 
____$5____ will go to the proposer. 
 
Due to extra funds for this project, the experimenter will also be providing $3 for 
participation. Therefore, the total you will receive is ___$5____ from the proposer + 
$3 from the experimenter = ___$8_____ 
 
 
Please check off one of these options to indicate what you would like to do: 
________ I would like to accept the offer. 
________ I would like to reject the offer. 
 
*** Note: To increase believability, dollar values were written in by the experimenter 
in the actual questionnaire handed to participants*** 
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APPENDIX F: BIG FIVE INVENTORY 
 
Please answer some additional questions about your partner. Here are a number of 
characteristics that may or may not apply to them. Give your best guess for the type of 
person that your partner might have been. 
 
I see my partner as someone who………… 
Not at all         Extremely 
1. is talkative  1  2  3  4  5 
2. tends to find fault with others  
3. does a thorough job    
4. is depressed, blue      
5. is original, comes up with new ideas  
6. is reserved      
7. is helpful and unselfish with others  
8. can be somewhat careless    
9. is relaxed, handles stress well   
10. is curious about many different things  
11. is full of energy     
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12. starts quarrels with others    
13. is a reliable worker    
14. can be tense    
15. is ingenious, a deep thinker  
16. generates a lot of enthusiasm  
17. has a forgiving nature   
18. tends to be disorganized   
19. worries a lot    
20. has an active imagination   
21. tends to be quiet   
22. is generally trusting   
23. tends to be lazy    
24. is emotionally stable, not easily upset  
25. is inventive     
26. has an assertive personality  
27. can be cold and aloof   
28. perseveres until the task is finished  
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29. can be moody    
30. values artistic, aesthetic experiences  
31. is sometimes shy, inhibited   
32. is considerate and kind to almost everyone  
33. does things efficiently    
34. remains calm in tense situations   
35. prefers work that is routine   
36. is outgoing, sociable   
37. is sometimes rude to others  
38. makes plans and follows through with them  
39. gets nervous easily    
40. likes to reflect, play with ideas   
41. has a few artistic interests    
42. likes to cooperate with others   
43. is easily distracted    
44. is sophisticated in art, music, or literature  
 
 35 
 
APPEDIX G: ADDITIONAL GAMES 
 
You will now be playing two more games. This time, the game will involve being 
paired with another person. Together, the two of you will need to come up with a 
cooperative strategy to get the most amount of points. 
 
The first game will involve filling out questionnaires with both you and your partner 
waiting in separate rooms. 
 
For the first game, please choose one of the following options: 
 
 ____ I would like to play with the same partner I have already been paired up 
with in the first (money allocating) game. 
 ____ I would like to play with a different partner. Please select one at random 
for me. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In the second game, you will play a cooperative game which will involve interacting 
with your partner face-to-face. 
 
For the second game, please choose one of the following options: 
 
 ____ I would like to play with the same partner I have already been paired up 
with in the first (money allocating) game.  
 ____ I would like to play with a different partner. Please select one at random 
for me. 
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APPENDIX H: CHARITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
We would also like to take this time to inform you about several charity organizations. 
Please read the next few pages carefully. 
UNICEF 
An estimated 300 million children worldwide are 
subjected to violence, exploitation and abuse 
including the worst forms of child labor in 
communities, schools and institutions; during armed 
conflict; and to harmful practices such as female 
genital mutilation/cutting and child marriage. Millions more, not yet victims, also 
remain without adequate protection.  
UNICEF advocates and supports the creation of a protective environment for children 
in partnership with governments, national and international partners including the 
private sector, and civil society.  National child protection systems, protective social 
practices and children’s own empowerment coupled with good oversight and 
monitoring are among the elements of a protective environment and enable countries, 
communities and families to prevent and respond to violence, exploitation and abuse. 
How worthy is this cause?   
Not at all         Extremely 
1       2          3      4          5               6       7 
How much do you believe in this cause’s mission statement?   
Not at all         Extremely 
1       2          3      4          5               6       7 
  
 37 
 
Doctors Without Borders (MSF) 
 Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) is an international medical 
humanitarian organization created by doctors 
and journalists in France in 1971. 
Today, MSF provides aid in nearly 60 
countries to people whose survival is threatened by violence, neglect, or catastrophe, 
primarily due to armed conflict, epidemics, malnutrition, exclusion from health care, 
or natural disasters. MSF provides independent, impartial assistance to those most in 
need. MSF reserves the right to speak out to bring attention to neglected crises, to 
challenge inadequacies or abuse of the aid system, and to advocate for improved 
medical treatments and protocols. 
In 1999, MSF received the Nobel Peace Prize. 
 
How worthy is this cause?   
Not at all         Extremely 
1       2          3      4          5               6       7 
How much do you believe in this cause’s mission statement?   
Not at all         Extremely 
1       2          3      4          5               6       7 
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Tompkins County ASPCA  
The Tompkins County SPCA was 
incorporated in February 1902 in an effort 
to prosecute individual cases of cruelty. In 
1904, the organization acquired sheltering 
facilities and took over as pound master for some of the municipalities within the 
county. For much of its history, the SPCA has employed humane officers to 
investigate individual cases of cruelty, as well as providing impound, sheltering and 
adoption of unwanted dogs, cats, and other animals.  
The mission of the SPCA of Tompkins County is to protect companion 
animals.  This is a no-kill shelter dedicated to preventing animal cruelty and 
overpopulation.  The ASPCA promotes responsible pet stewardship by providing 
education, counseling and training to nurture and enhance the human-animal bond. 
Currently, the SPCA has contracts for animal control with all townships, the City of 
Ithaca, the local Health Department, and the County for stray dog control, stray cat 
control, suspected rabid animal quarantine, cruelty enforcement, and the enforcement 
of local and state statutes regarding dogs. 
How worthy is this cause?   
Not at all         Extremely 
1       2          3      4          5               6       7 
How much do you believe in this cause’s mission statement?   
Not at all         Extremely 
1       2          3      4          5               6       7 
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Cornell Annual Fund 
Ezra Cornell's vision established 
a scope of learning and 
opportunity at Cornell that is 
unmatched by any other 
university. Whether it is of ethics, 
the life sciences, history, 
language, humanities or technology, Cornell remains at the forefront of society's 
greatest questions and challenges for the future.  
Our Investment supports Cornell's incredible diversity of students, subjects of 
study, and faculty. Your gifts to the Cornell Annual Fund are a vital part of what 
creates the atmosphere of innovation and excellence that is the hallmark of Cornell.  
Cornell Annual Fund giving programs offer a range of gift and volunteer opportunities 
to support our founders' vision. We hope you will choose to get involved, and support 
Cornell, and become part of the university's continued excellence in teaching, research 
and public service. 
How worthy is this cause?   
Not at all         Extremely 
1       2          3      4          5               6       7 
How much do you believe in this cause’s mission statement?   
Not at all         Extremely 
1       2          3      4          5               6       7 
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APPENDIX I: CHARITY DONATION PROMPT 
 
Would you like to donate to one of the charities you have just read about? 
____ Yes I would like to donate at this time. The amount I will be giving is $_______.  
 Which charity would you like to donate your money to? (Please select one): 
 ______ UNICEF 
 ______ Doctors Without Borders 
 ______ Tompkins County ASPCA 
 ______ Cornell Annual Fund 
____ No I would not like to donate at this time. 
Note: Your money is guaranteed to go directly to your charity of choice. No portion 
of your funds will be used for any other purpose. 
All participants should now follow these set of instructions 
1. please tear off this piece of paper 
2. enclose this piece of paper and any money you would like to donate in the 
white envelope provided. 
3. Seal the envelope and drop it into one of the manila envelope located on 
the table. 
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APPENDIX J: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
Finally, since we are interested in how accurate people are at discerning what others 
may be like based on impersonal situations, please give your best guess for the 
following: 
 
I think the other player is (check one): 
 
___ male 
___ female 
 
I believe the other player’s race is: 
 
__ Caucasian 
__ East or South Asian 
__ Hispanic 
__ Pacific Islander 
__ Native American 
__ African American 
__ Biracial/Interracial 
 
I believe the other player’s year in school is: 
 
___ Freshman 
___ Sophomore 
___ Junior 
___ Senior 
___ Graduate Student 
___ Faculty member 
___ Staff 
 
I believe the other player’s household income is: 
 
___ below $30,000 
___ $30,000-$50,000 
___ $50,000-$70,000 
___ $70,000-$100,000 
___ $100,000-$150,000 
___ over $150,000 
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Although we are unable to do this for purposes of anonymity, this game is normally 
played with two people interacting face-to-face. We therefore would like you to do 
your best to visualize the other player. 
As part of this exercise, please rate the other player on the following attributes. 
I imagine the other player to be: 
Not at all         Extremely 
1. attractive  1  2  3  4  5 
2. unintelligent 1  2  3  4  5 
3. interesting  1  2  3  4  5 
4. weak  1  2  3  4  5 
5. humorous  1  2  3  4  5 
6. manipulative 1  2  3  4  5 
7. charming  1  2  3  4  5 
8. smart  1  2  3  4  5 
9. masculine  1  2  3  4  5 
10. feminine  1  2  3  4  5 
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